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Abstract 
Most coalitions that form to increase contributions to a public good do not require full 
participation by all users of the public good, and therefore create incentives for free 
riding. If given the opportunity to opt out of a voluntary coalition, in theory, agents should 
try to be among the first to do so, forcing the remaining undecided agents to bear the 
cost of participating in the coalition. This study tests the predicted sequence of 
participation decisions in voluntary coalitions using real-time threshold public goods 
experiments. We find that subjects’ behavior is more consistent with the theoretical 
predictions when the difference in payoffs between coalition members and free-riding 
non-members is relatively large. 
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1 Introduction 
 
It is well known that privately funded public goods will, in many cases, be underprovided 
because self-interested agents will attempt to benefit from public goods without bearing 
the cost of providing them. As a result, the provision of public goods constitutes a social 
dilemma in which individually rational choices are not collectively rational. One way 
potentially to increase provision of a public good is with a voluntary coalition, through 
which a group of agents jointly commit to increasing their contributions to a public good. 
Such coalitions are appealing because in many situations agents would be willing to 
increase their contributions to a public good provided that others (or a subset of others) 
commit to doing the same. Coalitions of this nature can describe countries within 
international agreements to protect the environment, individuals when making charitable 
contributions, firms involved in domestic voluntary agreements and users of some 
common pool resources.  
 
Most voluntary coalitions that provide public goods do not require full participation by all 
agents involved before they are implemented. For example, the Kyoto Protocol, the 
international environmental agreement developed to manage global greenhouse gas 
emissions, required ratification from at least 55% of the parties to the Convention and 
those parties needed to account for at least 55% of the total 1990 greenhouse gas 
emissions (UNFCCC 1998). In general, participation thresholds established under 
voluntary coalitions do not require all users of a public good to become members and, 
as a result, there are incentives for agents to remain outside of a coalition in the hope of 
benefiting from the public good without bearing the cost of providing it. While all agents 
may benefit from an effective voluntary coalition (throughout, an effective coalition is 
one that leads to an increase in the provision of a public good), the non-members 
benefit disproportionately as a result of avoiding the cost of providing the public good. 
Thus, voluntary coalitions are susceptible to free-rider incentives that could undermine 
their ability to increase contributions to a public good. 
 
Related to the issue of free riding, one of the unique features of many voluntary 
coalitions is that, in general, the decision to join is made sequentially. A fixed window of 
time typically is established during which agents can decide voluntarily whether to 
become a member to a coalition. The sequential decision making process allows for a 
more calculated form of free riding compared to when participation decisions are made 
simultaneously because agents know with certainty whether their decision to join will be 
critical for meeting a minimum participation requirement. Moreover, if agents are given 
the chance to formally opt out of a coalition, in theory, rational agents should try to be 
among the first to do so (i.e., choose not to join the coalition) in order to place the cost 
of participating on the remaining undecided agents. Although the game-theoretic 
prediction is clear, attempting to be among the first to opt out of a voluntary coalition is 
not the only strategy available. For example, it is possible that agents may delay making 
their decision whether to participate—often referred to as a hold-out strategy—in the 
hope that enough of the other agents will join before them thereby satisfying the 
participation requirement (Swanson and Johnston 1999, p. 139; Barrett 2003, 
p. 142). 
In most situations agents can deliberately opt out of voluntary coalitions. For example, 
the United States opted out of the Kyoto Protocol when the Bush Administration 
disclosed that it had no intention of ratifying the Protocol in 2005. However, with many 
coalitions agents opt out only informally by not actively joining, and therefore data are 
not available to test the theoretical hypothesis that agents will try to be among the first 
to opt out of voluntary coalitions.2 Examining free-riding behavior in this setting is useful 
for guiding the design of effective participation rules that are fundamental to voluntary 
coalitions. This study analyzes a set of economic experiments in which subjects 
sequentially make explicit decisions whether to become members of a coalition. 
 
Real-time, sequential public goods experiments are used to investigate the extent to 
which subjects deliberately opt out of joining coalitions that disproportionately benefit 
the free-riding non-members. The experiments utilize a discrete choice, threshold public 
good framework similar to that of Van de Kragt et al. (1983), Dawes et al. (1986) and 
Marks and Croson (1998), with a real-time decision making processes similar to Dorsey 
(1992), Kurzban et al. (2001), Goren et al. (2003, 2004). In this study, subjects make a 
single decision whether or not to join a voluntary coalition. Players have a fixed amount 
of time to make this decision while constantly being updated regarding the decisions 
made by the other group members. Once all subjects have made their decision, if the 
participation threshold is satisfied then the members are committed to contributing to 
the public good. Otherwise, the members do not contribute to the public good, no level 
of the public good is provided and members do not incur any costs for joining the 
coalition. Throughout, the participation threshold is set to the smallest coalition of 
members required to make contributing to the public good profitable for them. In other 
words, the participation threshold ensures that the members are better off with a 
coalition than without one. 
 
Although previous experimental research has investigated the order of decisions made 
in sequential-choice, threshold public goods experiments (Erev and Rapoport 1990; 
Cooper and Stockman 2002; Goren et al. 2003; Coats and Neilson 2005), these studies 
were not specifically designed to investigate the real-time sequence in which subjects 
opt out of mutually beneficial coalitions. Erev and Rapoport (1990) test the theoretical 
predictions of a threshold public goods game in which the order of decisions is 
determined exogenously. Group members make their decision to contribute to a public 
good in a defined sequence knowing with certainty the decisions made by the player or 
players before them. Their design, however, does not capture the endogenous nature of 
the voluntary participation (or contribution) process found in most threshold public good 
environments outside of the laboratory. On the other hand, the study by Goren et al. 
(2003) does feature an environment in which decisions are made sequentially and the 
order of those decisions is endogenous. However, their design differs from our design in 
two fundamental ways. First, the players are asymmetric regarding their initial 
endowments, whereas the players in our study are symmetric. Second, and most 
importantly, the subjects begin each round in their experiment at the default position of 
not contributing to the public good and the only decision they can make is to change 
their position to contribute. Therefore, it is not possible to investigate the sequence of 
opting-out behavior from their results.  
Two treatments are considered in this study, one in which the cost of contributing to the 
public good is relatively low (three of the ten players must join to satisfy the participation 
threshold, referred to as the low-cost treatment) and one in which the cost of 
contributing to the public good is relatively high (six of the ten players must join to 
satisfy the participation threshold, referred to as the high-cost treatment). A number of 
interesting results follow from this research. First, the percentage of trials in which an 
effective voluntary coalition formed (i.e., the participation threshold was either met or 
surpassed) was significantly lower in the high-cost treatment in which the participation 
threshold and the relative benefits from free riding were large compared to the low-cost 
treatment (62% versus 96%). It is important to note that if a voluntary coalition did not 
form in either treatment it was because too many subjects chose to opt out of a coalition 
that would be mutually beneficial but disproportionately benefit free-riding non-
members. 
 
Second, the data show a complete reversal of the overall participation strategy 
implemented by the group members between the two treatments. Although exact 
equilibrium play was rare, the behavior of subjects in the high-cost treatment, in which 
the participation threshold and the relative payoffs to free riding were high, more closely 
resembled the theoretical predictions when compared to the low-cost treatment. In the 
high-cost treatment, the majority of the first decisions were made by subjects 
deliberately opting out of voluntary coalitions, while the reverse was true with the low-
cost treatment. In summary, the sequence of subjects’ participation decisions best 
matched the theoretical predictions when the difference in payoffs between coalition 
members and free-riding non-members was relatively large. 
 
2 Voluntary coalitions that provide a public good 
 
This section presents a simple model of the formation of a voluntary coalition to provide 
a public good. The model is used to derive the equilibrium level of participation with a 
voluntary coalition which will be tested using the experiments described in the section 
that follows. To begin, consider n identical players with payoff functions 
 
(1)     
where qi is equal to one if player i contributes to the public good and is zero if she does 
not, q−i is the sum of the contributions by all other players, b is the constant marginal 
benefit of contributing to the public good, c is the cost of contributing, and A is a positive 
constant. The underlying structure of the players’ interactions with each other is an n-
player prisoners’ dilemma, requiring b < c and nb > c. That is, all players have a 
dominant strategy not to contribute to the public good in a noncooperative Nash 
equilibrium, but the players’ joint payoffs will be maximized when they all contribute. 
Thus, players have an incentive to form a voluntary coalition as a means of increasing 
contributions to the public good. 
 
Following Ulph (2004) and Kolstad (2007), the formation of a voluntary coalition is 
modeled as a two-stage game. In the first stage, each player decides independently 
whether or not to join a coalition. Players make this decision while having complete 
information regarding the payoff functions of the other players and having perfect 
information regarding the choices made by the other n − 1 players. That is, each player 
is aware of how many players have joined the coalition, how many players have not 
joined the coalition and how many players have not yet decided. Once all players have 
made their decisions in the first stage, the second stage begins. 
 
Let s denote the number of members to the coalition in the first stage. In the second 
stage, each member contributes to the public good provided that s ≥ smin, where smin 
is the minimum number of members required for individual contributions to the public 
good to be profitable (referred to as the participation threshold). If s <smin after the first 
stage, then the members do not contribute to the public good in the second stage. The 
n−s players that did not join the coalition in the first stage maximize their individual 
payoffs by not contributing to the public good in the second stage, regardless of the 
number of members. The derivation of the participation threshold is discussed next. 
 
Let πm(s) denote the payoff of each of the coalition members if they contribute to the 
public good, and let πm(s) denote the payoff of each of the non-members. (The 
superscript m signals that the player in question is a member of the coalition, while the 
superscript nm signals that the player is not a member of the coalition.) From (1), the 
payoff functions for each coalition member and for each non-member are: 
 
(2)     
 
Since b < c, nb > c, and πm(s) is increasing in s, there exist profitable coalition sizes 
that are strictly greater than one and weakly less than n. The smallest of these profitable 
coalitions is 
 
(3)     
 
Given smin as the participation threshold, the equilibrium number of members that join 
the coalition in stage 1, s∗, is determined by adopting the well-known stability conditions 
often utilized in the context of cartels and international environmental agreements (e.g., 
D’Aspremont et al. 1983; Barrett 1994; Ulph 2004; Kolstad 2007). Following 
D’Aspremont et al. (1983), a coalition of members is considered stable if no member 
wants to leave the coalition (the coalition is internally stable) and no non-member wants 
to join the coalition (the coalition is externally stable). 
 
It is easy to demonstrate that in this game the only internally and externally stable 
coalition is the smallest profitable coalition of members, smin. To see why, note that for 
coalitions where s > smin at least one member could leave the coalition and the 
remaining members would still find it profitable to contribute to the public good.5 Since 
individuals are motivated to leave a coalition of any size s > smin, these coalitions are 
not internally stable. On the other hand, a coalition of size s = smin is internally stable, 
because if one member leaves the coalition it is no longer profitable for the remaining 
members to contribute to the public good. Since no individual would provide the public 
good in this case, a defector’s payoff would simply be πnm(0) = A, which is weakly less 
than its payoff if it stayed in the coalition, πm(smin) = A + bsmin − c. Finally, it is easy to 
show that all profitable coalitions are externally stable because πm(s +1)−πnm(s) = b −c 
<0, which indicates that an individual who joins an already profitable coalition is worse 
off in comparison to staying out of the coalition altogether. 
 
Since coalitions of size smin are the only internally and externally stable coalitions, the 
subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium of the voluntary coalition game is that s∗ = smin 
players join the coalition in the first stage and make their contributions to the public 
good in the second. With discrete choices and identical players it is not possible to 
identify which of the s ∗ players will join the coalition and which players will not.6 
Therefore the subgame-perfect Nash equilibria in this game are defined by any set of s∗ 
players joining the coalition in stage 1 (and thus contributing to the public good in stage 
2) and n−s* players not joining the coalition and not contributing to the public good. 
However, because players make their decisions whether or not to join a coalition in 
stage 1 consecutively while having real-time information about the choices made by the 
other n − 1 players, it is possible to further define the set of equilibria. Because free-
riding non-members earn strictly higher payoffs than coalition members by the amount 
πnm(s) − πm(s) = c, opting out of the coalition is a Nash strategy for the first n − s* 
decision makers. And because voluntary coalitions of size s∗, by definition, are 
profitable for the members even after the n − s∗ players have decided to opt out of the 
coalition, the remaining s∗ players maximize their earnings by joining the coalition.8 
Thus, in equilibrium the voluntary coalition consists of s∗ members each contributing to 
the public good and n− s* free-riding non-members. 
 
3 Experimental design 
 
The following experiments were designed to test empirically the equilibria from the 
model in Sect. 2. Although results are reported on the frequency of trials in which the 
participation threshold was satisfied and the respective size of the voluntary coalitions, 
the focus of this research is on the relative timing of players’ decisions in stage 1. That 
is, the primary interest is the extent to which subjects deliberately opt out of joining 
voluntary coalitions that are mutually beneficial but disproportionately benefit the free-
riding non-members. Our two treatments vary in the cost of contributing to the public 
good, which in turn varies the participation threshold and the difference between 
member and non-member payoffs (i.e., the net benefits to free riding). 
 
All of the experimental sessions were held in a computer lab at the University of 
Massachusetts at Amherst using undergraduate and graduate students as subjects 
recruited from the general student population. In each of the treatments, subjects were 
in groups of n = 10 and made independent decisions at a computer station using 
software specifically designed for this project. Subjects were brought into the computer 
lab, seated and paid five dollars for arriving on time. During each session, two ten-
subject groups were in the lab concurrently. 
The participants were each provided with a folder at their computer station containing 
their consent form and a set of instructions [Included as a Electronic Supplementary 
Material]. The instructions were read aloud by the moderator and at times the subjects 
were asked to look up at a presentation in the front of the computer lab for further 
clarification of the instructions. After answering a series of practice questions, a 13-
period experiment began. 
 
Each period, participants were assigned randomly to one of the two groups such that 
the same ten people were never in the same group more than once. The random 
assignment of groups was done to mitigate potential problems of reputation that can 
occur when the same people interact in a repeated setting (Andreoni and Croson 2008). 
Two sessions were conducted for each treatment, and therefore in total, four groups of 
ten subjects participated in 13 rounds each, resulting in 52 group-level observations and 
520 individual-level observations per treatment. The earnings were reported in 
experimental dollars, and ten experimental dollars exchanged for one US dollar. 
Earnings in US dollars were paid in cash once the experiment was over. 
 
To avoid potential biases subjects may have regarding the provision of public goods, 
and to generalize our experimental results to all applications of cooperative coalitions, a 
neutral frame was established for the context and language of the experiment. In these 
experiments participants made decisions regarding the production of an unspecified 
product. Specifically, they chose either to agree to produce one unit of an unspecified 
product, or not agree to produce the unit. An agreement was said to ‘form’ if enough 
subjects agreed to produce to satisfy the participation threshold. The groups were 
informed of the participation threshold at the beginning of the experiment. While 
subjects were making their decisions whether to agree to produce they were provided 
with real-time information about the decisions made by the other nine members in the 
group. Specifically, they were informed about the number of other subjects that agreed 
to produce, the number of other subjects that did not agree to produce and the number 
of other subjects that had not yet made a decision. Also, in order to limit the duration of 
each period, they only had 60 seconds to make their decisions. If someone failed to 
decide before the time was up, she chose not agree to produce by default. 
 
The software was designed with a number of features to ensure that decisions were 
truly sequential. For example, if more than one subject made a decision within the same 
second, only the first decision was recorded. In those situations the subjects whose 
decision was blocked received a message informing them that their action was not 
recorded and instructed them that the group’s information has changed. Those subjects 
could then reevaluate their position and were given the opportunity to make another 
decision. In addition, if a group member made a decision within the last five seconds of 
the round when some subjects remained undecided, an additional five seconds were 
added to the time remaining. This feature provided undecided subjects enough time to 
assimilate the changes before making their decision. 
 
3.1 Low-cost of contributing to the public good 
 
In this treatment, the individual cost of contributing to the public good, c, was low 
(relative to the treatment described in Sect. 3.2). Throughout, this treatment is referred 
to as the low-cost treatment. Parameter values of n = 10, A = 8, b = 3 and c = 7 were 
chosen for (1), and by using (3) the participation threshold was smin = 3 (i.e., the next 
integer value greater than 7/3). Thus, if at least three of the ten group members agreed 
to produce, then the agreement formed and those individuals who agreed to produce 
automatically produced the product and earned πm(s) using (2). If less than three group 
members agreed to produce, the entire group did not produce and each subject earned 
eight experimental dollars, i.e., πnm(0) = 8. Those subjects that chose not agree to 
produce, did not produce the product regardless of whether the agreement formed and 
earned πnm(s) using (2). 
 
Given our choice of parameters and the results of the model from Sect. 2, we can 
specify our first testable hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis 1 In the low-cost treatment the first n – s∗ = 7 players to make a decision 
will choose to opt out of the voluntary coalition and the last s ∗ = 3 players to make a 
decision will choose to join the coalition. 
 
Table 1 shows a subject’s payoff possibilities for each period of the experiment. This 
table was created by substituting the parameter values into the equations in (2), and its 
layout 
 
Table 1 Earnings table for the low-cost treatment 
 
 
 
Table 2 Earnings table for the high-cost treatment 
 
 
is consistent with the earnings table used by Rapoport and Eshed-Levy (1989). The 
boxes marked with an X indicate outcomes that are not possible because the 
participation threshold would not be met in those circumstances. To see why, note that 
the top row of Table 1 corresponds to the number of other subjects (ranging from 0 to 9) 
producing the good. However, production can occur only if at least three members of 
the group agree to produce. Therefore, under no circumstance could only one or two 
members of the group produce the good, and hence the X’s. All elements of the 
earnings table were clearly explained to the subjects before the experiment began. 
3.2 High-cost of contributing to the public good 
 
This treatment proceeded exactly as the low-cost treatment except that the cost of 
contributing to the public good, c, was increased from 7 to 15.08. Throughout, this 
treatment is referred to as the high-cost treatment. The parameter values were thus set 
at n = 10, A = 8, b = 3 and c = 15.08 and using (3), the participation threshold was 
derived at s = 6 (i.e., the next integer value greater than 15.08/3). If at least six of the 
ten group members agreed to produce, then the agreement formed and those 
individuals who agreed to produce automatically produced the product and earned 
πm(s) using (2). If less than six group members agreed to produce, the entire group did 
not produce and each subject earned eight experimental dollars, i.e., πnm(0) = 8. Those 
subjects who chose not to agree to produce, did not produce the product regardless if 
the agreement formed and earned πnm(s) using (2). Given our choice of parameters 
and the results of the model from Sect. 2, we have our second testable hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis 2 In the high-cost treatment the first n−s∗ = 4 players to make a decision 
will choose to opt out of the voluntary coalition and the last s∗ = 6 players to make a 
decision will choose to join the coalition. 
 
Table 2 displays a subject’s payoff possibilities for the high-cost treatment, where the 
X’s, as in Table 1, indicate impossible outcomes.10 Table 3 summarizes the 
experimental design. 
 
Table 3 Experiment design summary 
 
 
Table 4 Coalition formation and public good provision 
 
4 Results 
 
The summary statistics for this study are displayed in Table 4. As previous studies have 
found (Van de Kragt et al. 1983; Dawes et al. 1986; Suleiman and Rapoport 1992; 
Rapoport and Suleiman 1993; Cadsby and Maynes 1999), raising the participation 
threshold significantly reduces the frequency of public good provision. Specifically, 
coalitions formed in only 61.5% of trials when the participation threshold was six 
players, a significant decrease compared with 96.2% of trials when the participation 
threshold was three players (61.5% versus 96.2%, p < 0.001).11 In aggregate, 
coalitions formed in 78.8% of all trials for this study. Previous studies on sequential 
threshold public goods report similar findings. Specifically, Erev and Rapoport (1990) 
report 66.7% of trials with successful provision, Goren et al. (2003) report 88.9% and 
81.8% successes from their two sessions and Goren et al. (2004) report successes of 
73.8% and 72.4% for their two sessions. When coalitions did form in our experiments 
there were more members in the high-cost treatment (6.19 versus 4.26, p <0.001), 
however, the average provision of the public good over all trials was not significantly 
different across the two treatments (3.81 versus 4.10, p = 0.243). 
 
The reason for such a significant decrease in the frequency of public good provision 
between the two treatments, however, is unclear. Previous studies typically have 
attributed this decrease in provision to the increased coordination problem among 
players caused by the higher threshold. However, with sequential decisions and perfect 
information regarding other players’ decisions, the same coordination problems do not 
exist. This paper, to our knowledge, is the first to vary thresholds within sequential 
decision making environments with complete information. A second fundamental 
difference between this study and the studies referenced in the paragraph above is that 
the threshold in our experiments is not independent of the value of the public good. The 
higher threshold in this study is the result of the added cost of contributing, which in turn 
increases the minimum sized profitable coalition. Most importantly, a higher participation 
threshold corresponds to greater relative payoffs for the free riders. With the existing 
experimental design it is not possible to determine whether coalitions form less 
frequently in these experiments because more members are required to join in order to 
satisfy the participation threshold (e.g., a coordination problem) or because subjects are 
willing to suffer individual losses by deliberately causing a coalition not form in order to 
punish would-be free riders (e.g., spiteful behavior, as reported by Cason et al. 2004). 
 
The primary interest of this study is the relative order of players’ participation decisions 
and the sequence as to which subjects, as predicted by the model in Sect. 2, opt out of 
voluntary coalitions that disproportionately benefit free riders. Recall from Sect. 2 that, in 
theory, the first set of decisions made in each ten-person group will be made by players 
choosing not to join a coalition. As formulated in Hypothesis 1, in the low-cost treatment 
the first seven subjects are expected to opt out of the coalition and the last three 
subjects are expected to join the coalition. Likewise, from Hypothesis 2, in the high-cost 
treatment the first four players to make a decision are expected to opt out of the 
coalition forcing the remaining six players to maximize their individual earnings by 
joining the coalition. 
In the low-cost treatment groups never played the Nash equilibrium exactly, and in the 
high-cost treatment exact equilibrium play occurred in only four trials. Therefore, our 
data reject the two testable hypotheses put forth in Sect. 3.12 However, interesting 
comparisons can be made between the two treatments. First, from the last two columns 
in Table 4 it is clear that group behavior in the high-cost treatment was more consistent 
with the theoretical predictions. Column five in Table 4 lists the percentage of coalitions 
that formed with the predicted number of members; that is, three members in the low-
cost treatment and six members in the high-cost treatment.When coalitions formed in 
the low-cost treatment, only 30% of those coalitions had the predicted level of 
participation while the remaining 70% exhibited over-participation. Contrast this with the 
results from the high-cost treatment in which 88% of effective coalitions had exactly the 
predicted six members (30% versus 88%, p <0.001). 
 
The last column in Table 4 lists the percentage of effective coalitions in which the last 
decision made was critical for a coalition to form. Recall, the model predicts that the last 
decision should always be critical for coalition formation. In the low-cost treatment, the 
participation threshold was satisfied after the last player made her decision in only 4% 
of the effective trials. In the high-cost treatment, on the other hand, the last person’s 
decision was critical for coalition formation in 41% of the trials (4% versus 41%, p 
<0.001). Together, the information in the last two columns in Table 4 suggests that 
although the precise order of  
 
 
Fig. 1 Percent of ordered decisions in which subjects chose to opt out of a 
voluntary coalition 
 
subjects’ decisions deviated from the theoretical prediction, group behavior in the high-
cost treatment more closely resembled equilibrium play. 
 
Figure 1 illustrates the most interesting result of this research. The graph shows that the 
higher participation threshold caused a complete reversal of the overall participation 
strategy implemented by the group members. The horizontal axis in Fig. 1 lists the order 
of decisions made from one to ten, and the vertical axis displays the percentage of 
those decisions (52 in total for each rank order) in which subjects decided to opt out of 
the coalition. Although all ten decisions are listed on this graph, focus attention on the 
first four decision makers because in both the high-cost and low-cost treatments, the 
theoretical model from Sect. 2 (and the hypotheses from Sect. 3) predicts that 100% of 
the first four decisions should be made by subjects opting out of the voluntary coalition. 
 
In the low-cost treatment, in contrast to Hypothesis 1, the majority of the first four 
decisions was made by subjects willing to join a coalition, not by subjects choosing to 
opt out. Moreover, the majority of the last six decisions in the low-cost treatment was 
made by subjects opting out of the coalition. Rather than subjects trying to be among 
the first to free ride as the model predicts, the results of this treatment are more 
consistent with the description of a hold-out strategy in which subjects with free-riding 
motives hold off on making a decision in hope that a subset of the other group members 
will fulfill the participation requirement (Swanson and Johnston 1999: 139; Barrett 2003: 
142). 
 
The opposite behavior is observed in the high-cost treatment. From Fig. 1, at least 50% 
of each of the first four decision makers decided to opt out of the coalition.13 This type 
of behavior is more consistent with the theoretical predictions from the model in Sect. 2 
relative to the low-cost treatment. The results show that when the participation threshold 
was increased, the participation strategy with voluntary coalitions changed completely 
and did so in line with the predictions from the theoretical model. 
 
We estimated a logit regression model to provide a better understanding of how the 
increase in the cost of contributing to the public good, and thus an increase in the 
participation threshold, affected subjects’ decisions to opt out of a voluntary coalition. 
Specifically, we estimate 
 
 
 
where Optout = 1 if subject i opted out of out of the coalition in period t , HC and LC 
indicate the high-cost and low-cost treatments respectively, #mem is the number of 
existing coalition members when subject i made her participation decision, rank is the 
endogenously determined order in which subject i made her decision (1 to 10) and ψt is 
a vector of T −1 dummies that capture potential period effects. A subject-specific 
random-effects specification of the error term (uit = αi + εit, where αi captures random 
effects and εit is the contemporaneous error term) was chosen in order to control for 
potentially strong individual effects that can occur when the same subject makes 
multiple decisions within a treatment. All observations in which opting out of the coalition 
was not a subject’s Nash strategy were excluded (151 observations were excluded). 
Therefore, observations were dropped for two reasons: (1) when too many subjects had 
already opted out of the coalition so that the participation threshold could not be 
satisfied regardless of the subject’s decision, and (2) when a subject’s decision was 
critical in the sense that if she did not join the coalition the participation threshold could 
not have been satisfied.  
 
In addition to including the treatment variable (HC = 1 for observations from the high-
cost treatment), interaction variables were included to capture the potential influence the 
existing number of coalition members and the rank order of decisions might have on a 
subject’s decision to opt out of a coalition in each treatment. Two variables interacting 
the treatment with the number of existing coalition members were included (HC·#mem 
and LC·#mem). In addition, the variables HC · rank and LC · rank interact the dummy 
variables for treatment with the order of the decision (ranging from 1st to 10th). Two 
variables interacting the treatment and rank squared (HC · rank2 and LC · rank2) were 
also included to capture a potentially nonlinear relationship between the likelihood of 
opting out of a coalition and the order of the decision. In total, the regression includes 
data from 80 unique subjects with a total of 889 observations. The regression results 
are contained in Table 5. 
 
The significance of the dummy variable for the high-cost treatment (p <0.001) indicates 
that increasing the cost of contributing to the public good, and thus increasing the 
participation threshold, significantly increases the likelihood of a subject opting out of a 
coalition. Recall, the dataset used to estimate the model is restricted to observations in 
which opting out is the theoretical prediction. Thus, subjects’ behavior in the high-cost 
treatment more closely resembles the theoretical prediction of opting out relative to the 
low-cost treatment. 
 
Matching the trend illustrated in Fig. 1, the negative coefficient attached to HC · rank 
indicates that the early decision makers are more likely to opt out of a coalition relative 
to those later in the sequence (p < 0.001). However, as suggested by the coefficient for 
HC · rank2, subjects’ behavior in this treatment eventually switches with subjects 
becoming more likely to opt out of the coalition the later, relative to others, they make 
their decision (p < 0.001). This effect is illustrated in Fig. 1 in which the line for the high-
cost treatment bends upward around the sixth decision maker. In general these results 
suggest that although we would predict universal opting out at all ranks, we find that the 
earliest and latest decision makers in the high-cost treatment are relatively more likely 
to opt out. On the other hand,  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5 Effect of treatment, rank order of decision and number of coalition 
members on the decision to opt out of a voluntary coalition 
 
Notes: The dependent variable is the binary decision whether to opt out of the coalition (1 = not agree to 
produce, 0 = agree to produce) 
 
in the low-cost treatment the rank order of decisions has a significant influence on 
subjects’ behavior only for the later decision makers; that is, the later decision makers 
are more likely to opt out of voluntary coalition (p = 0.008). 
 
Finally, the positive coefficients for HC · #mem and LC · #mem reveal that the 
likelihood of a subject joining a coalition increases in the number of coalition members 
(p = 0.020 and p = 0.326, respectively), but this result is significant only for the high-cost 
treatment. Although the experiments were not designed to formally test for it, the results 
indicate a pattern of ‘conditional cooperation’ in which subjects act cooperatively (i.e., 
join a coalition) given that other members already have (Fischbacher et al. 2001; Frey 
and Meier 2004). Although this behavior is not predicted by the theoretical model, it is 
not surprising in light of previous experimental evidence. The results suggest that 
subjects are more likely to participate in voluntary coalitions if others already have 
committed to doing so. 
 
5 Conclusion 
 
These experiments investigate the extent to which subjects deliberately opt out of 
voluntary coalitions that provide public goods. Examining free-riding behavior in this 
setting is useful for guiding the design of effective participation rules that are part of all 
voluntary coalitions. The predictions from the theoretical model are salient; the first set 
of decisions will be made by subjects choosing to opt out of a voluntary coalition. 
Although our experimental analysis does not explore the reasons subjects behave as 
they do, in theory opting out early of a voluntary coalition forces those who remain into 
joining the coalition and contributing to the public good. By forcing others to join the 
coalition and contribute to the public good, free riders avoid paying the cost of 
contributing while enjoying the benefits. 
 
Two scenarios were considered, one in which the participation threshold required three 
players (out of ten) to join a coalition and the other in which the participation threshold 
required six players. Although subjects did not behave as theoretically predicted, 
interesting comparisons can be made between our two treatments. The results show a 
complete reversal of the subjects’ participation strategies between the two treatments. 
When the participation threshold was low, in contrast to what the theoretical model 
predicts, the majority of the first decisions were made by subjects willing to join a 
coalition. In contrast, when the participation threshold was high, the majority of the first 
decisions were made by subjects deliberately opting out of a voluntary coalition. The 
results from the treatment with the higher participation threshold were more consistent 
with the prediction that the first set of decisions will be made by subjects choosing to opt 
out of voluntary coalitions. 
 
The reason for the complete reversal in behavior between the two scenarios, however, 
is unclear. One hypothesis stems from the fact that in our experiments the participation 
threshold increases in response to increases in the cost of contributing to the public 
good, and therefore a higher participation threshold results in larger relative payoffs 
going to free riders. As a result, subjects may have stronger incentives to opt out of 
coalitions with higher participation thresholds. The widening gap between member and 
non-member payoffs may also explain the low frequency of trials in which the 
participation threshold was satisfied when the threshold was raised. It is possible that 
subjects were willing to sacrifice individual earnings by preventing coalitions from 
forming in order to prevent potential non-members from free riding (e.g., spiteful 
behavior). 
 
Our experiments provide insights into the sequence of participation and the overall 
provision of a public good when agents have the opportunity to deliberately opt out of a 
voluntary coalition. Further research is required to rigorously address the question of 
why subjects reversed their participation strategies when the participation threshold was 
raised. As a starting point, it would be interesting to observe if subjects change their 
behavior when the participation threshold is raised while keeping the difference between 
member and non-member payoffs constant. This treatment would allow the researcher 
to separate the effect of an increase in the relative payoffs going to free riders from an 
increase in the participation threshold. In addition, variation in the participation threshold 
should be explored as it is possible that behavior may change when the threshold is set 
closer to the extremes. There are a number of scenarios that need to be explored in 
order to determine what influences the decision to participate, or deliberately not 
participate, in a voluntary coalition. 
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